Liquidation preferences
In a sale, preferred stock gets paid before common stock. Learn each type of preference and how it changes what the founders take home.
In this lesson you will learn
- How a 1x non-participating preference works, and when the investor converts
- What participation, a participation cap, and a preference multiple do to the payouts
- How seniority and pari passu divide a small sale between two rounds
- Which preference terms are market in 2025-2026
Northwind Labs sells for $40M. Ada, Ben, and the team own 80% of the company, so they think that they get $32M. They get $30M. With a different clause in the same term sheet, they get $24M, or less. This lesson explains the clause that moves those millions: the liquidation preference.
Why a sale counts as a liquidation
A liquidation preference is the right of preferred holders to get their money back before common holders get anything. The word “liquidation” makes you think of a company that closes. But the preference matters most in a sale. The charter treats a merger in which the stockholders lose control, or a sale of almost all of the assets, as a deemed liquidation event. Thus a sale starts the preference, the same as a shutdown. When a company closes, usually no money is left to divide.
This lesson uses one example. Northwind’s Series A investor pays $10M for 2,000,000 preferred shares at $5.00 each. This price is the original issue price. The founders and the team hold 8,000,000 common shares. Thus the investor owns 20% as converted, and the post-money valuation is $50M.
1x non-participating: the larger of two amounts
The standard preference is 1x and non-participating. In a sale, the investor selects one of two amounts:
- Its preference: 1 × its money, which is $10M
- Its as-converted share: it converts to common and takes 20% of the sale.
The investor takes the larger amount, never the two together:
Investor payout = the larger of
the preference, or
ownership × sale price
$40M sale:
Preference = $10M
20% × $40M = $8M
-> keeps the $10M preference
$100M sale:
Preference = $10M
20% × $100M = $20M
-> converts and takes $20M
In the $40M sale, the investor gets $10M and the common holders get the other $30M. That is why the team gets $30M, not 80% of $40M.
Predict first
At what sale price does the investor start to get more from conversion than from its $10M preference?
Type a guess before you continue. A guess first, even a wrong one, makes the answer easier to remember.
Conversion pays more when 20% × the sale price is more than $10M. That occurs at $10M ÷ 20% = $50M, the post-money valuation of the round. At a lower sale price, the investor keeps its $10M preference. At a higher price, it converts.
The sale price where conversion starts to pay more is the conversion point:
Conversion point
= preference ÷ ownership
= $10M ÷ 20%
= $50M
Try the preference terms
Move the sale price in the widget. Then change the participation and the multiple, and look at how the two lines bend.
Simulator
One investor, one sale
Pick the preference terms and a sale price. See how the money divides between the investor and the common holders.
- Investor gets
- $10M
- 20% as converted is $8M
- Common gets
- $30M
- $40M − $10M
- Common's part
- 75%
- Common owns 80%
- Converts at
- $50M
- $10M ÷ 20%
How this sale divides
- Investor
- Common holders
Payout at every sale price
- Investor
- Common holders
20% as converted is $8M, less than the $10M preference. The investor keeps the preference, and common gets the other $30M. The investor converts only at a sale price more than $50M.
Participating preferred: the double dip
Participating preferred gets its preference and a share of the rest. Founders call it the “double dip.” The steps for a $40M sale:
Worked example · step 1 of 4
A $40M sale with 1x participating preferred
- 1
Pay the preference
The investor gets its $10M first.
$40M − $10M = $30M left
As a percentage, participation costs the common holders the most in small and medium sales:
- From $10M to $50M, participation takes 20% of the money that common gets with a non-participating preference.
- At more than $50M, the cost stays at $8M: the $10M preference × 80%. At a larger sale, that $8M is a smaller percentage: 10% of the common money at $100M, and 3.3% at $300M.
Small and medium sales occur much more frequently than very large sales. Uncapped participation also never converts, because the double dip always pays at least as much as conversion.
Capped participation and the dead zone
A participation cap sets a maximum on the total payout of a participating investor, often a multiple of its money. Carta calls caps of two or three times the investment typical. With a 3x cap, Northwind’s investor can get at most $30M from the preference and the participation together. At a high sale price, the investor converts instead:
The payout reaches the cap at
preference
+ (cap − preference) ÷ ownership
= $10M + ($30M − $10M) ÷ 20%
= $110M
The investor converts at more than
cap ÷ ownership
= $30M ÷ 20%
= $150M
From $110M to $150M, the investor’s payout stays at $30M. In this dead zone, the common holders get each added dollar of the sale. Set the participation to “Capped” in the widget, and find the flat part of the investor line.
Multiples: 2x and more
A preference multiple of 2x pays the investor two times its money before common gets anything. With a 2x non-participating preference, Northwind’s investor takes $20M first. In a $20M sale, common gets nothing. The conversion point also doubles, to $20M ÷ 20% = $100M. The 2x preference pays the same as 1x only at $100M or more.
The table puts the four structures side by side. Each cell gives the investor’s payout, then the common holders’ payout, in millions of dollars:
| Sale price | 1x non-participating | 1x participating | 1x participating, 3x cap | 2x non-participating |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $20M | 10 / 10 | 12 / 8 | 12 / 8 | 20 / 0 |
| $40M | 10 / 30 | 16 / 24 | 16 / 24 | 20 / 20 |
| $100M | 20 / 80 | 28 / 72 | 28 / 72 | 20 / 80 |
| $150M | 30 / 120 | 38 / 112 | 30 / 120 | 30 / 120 |
| $300M | 60 / 240 | 68 / 232 | 60 / 240 | 60 / 240 |
Cumulative dividends make the preference grow
A term sheet can also add dividends to the preference. With cumulative dividends, a yearly percentage accumulates, the same as interest on a loan. The company does not pay it in cash, but it adds the total to the preference. Term sheets that have this clause usually set a rate of 5% to 8%:
Preference after 5 years
= $10M + ($10M × 8% × 5 years)
= $10M + $4M
= $14M
In a $40M sale, common now gets $26M, not $30M. The conversion point also moves, from $50M to $14M ÷ 20% = $70M. Non-cumulative dividends, which the company pays only if the board declares them, cost the founders nothing. Cumulative dividends are rare, but the numbers vary by data set. Wilson Sonsini found them in 1% of its 1H 2026 deals, and Cooley found accruing dividends in 3% of its Q2 2026 deals.
Seniority: two rounds, one small sale
With two or more rounds, the charter also sets the order of payment between the series of preferred stock. This order is the seniority:
- Stacked: the newest round is senior. It gets its full preference first, then the round before it, and so on.
- Pari passu: the series rank equally. They divide the money in proportion to the size of their preferences.
Pari passu is Latin for “on equal footing.” For example, Northwind’s Series A has a $10M preference, and its Series B has a $20M preference. The total is $30M. A buyer pays $25M:
Stacked, Series B senior:
Series B = $20M
Series A = $25M − $20M = $5M
Pari passu:
Series A = $25M × 10 ÷ 30 = $8.33M
Series B = $25M × 20 ÷ 30 = $16.67M
The common holders get nothing in the two cases. If the buyer pays $40M, the order does not matter. Each series gets its full preference, and the common holders get the remaining $10M.
Simulator
Who comes first: stacked or pari passu
Series A has a $10M preference and Series B has a $20M preference, $30M in total. Move the sale price and change the order of payment.
- Series B gets
- $20M
- Pari passu: $16.67M
- Series A gets
- $5M
- Pari passu: $8.33M
- Common gets
- $0
- Pari passu: $0
Payout at every sale price
- Series B
- Series A
- Common
The sale pays $25M against $30M of preferences, so common gets nothing. Series B is senior, so it takes its full $20M first. Series A gets the last $5M. Pari passu, Series A gets $8.33M.
What is market in 2025-2026
Practice
Work it out
An investor puts in $6M for 25% with a 1x non-participating preference. The company sells for $20M. How much does the investor get?
As converted, the investor gets 25% × $20M = $5M. That is less than the $6M preference, so the investor keeps the preference and gets $6M. The common holders get $14M.
Work it out
Use the same deal, but the preference is participating, with no cap. The company sells for $20M. How much do the common holders get?
The investor takes its $6M preference first, and $14M remains. Then the investor takes 25% × $14M = $3.5M. The common holders get 75% × $14M = $10.5M, not $14M.
Quiz · question 1 of 6
Test what you learned
An investor puts in $10M for 20%, with a 1x non-participating preference. The company sells for $40M. What does the investor get?
Key takeaways
- 1.A non-participating investor gets the larger of its preference or its as-converted share of the sale, never the two.
- 2.With one round and a 1x non-participating preference, the investor converts only when the sale price is more than the post-money valuation of that round.
- 3.Participating preferred takes its preference and then a share of the rest. Uncapped participation costs the common holders money at each sale price that is more than the preference.
- 4.A preference multiple of more than 1x and uncapped participation are rare in 2025-2026. Treat them as red flags.
- 5.Seniority changes the payouts only when the sale price is less than the total of the preferences.
Sources
- 1.Anatomy of a Term Sheet: Series A Financing (with the NVCA model term sheet). McCarter & English, Q4 2020.
- 2.Q2 2026 Venture Financing Report. Cooley, August 17, 2026.
- 3.The Entrepreneurs Report: Private Company Financing Trends, Q2 2026. Wilson Sonsini, September 2026.
- 4.State of Private Markets: Q1 2026. Carta, May 29, 2026.
- 5.Liquidation Preferences: Standard & Non-Standard Terms. Carta, Accessed November 2026.
- 6.Explanation of Certain Terms Used in Venture Financing Terms Survey. Fenwick & West, February 2012.